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(AND UNEXPECTED)  
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S WAR ON DRUGS 
 




A cacophony of cries for criminal justice reform reverberates 
from a growing chorus of discouraged, disillusioned and divergent 
concerns across America.  Though any number of factors supplies 
ample cause for unease with the current state of our criminal justice 
system, extraordinarily high rates of incarceration certainly contribute 
mightily to the turmoil.  Hyper-criminalization challenges abound 
questioning the necessity of the volumes of crime statutes demanding 
enforcement.  Unacceptable rates of recidivism and questionable 
policing are included in the catalog of troubling dynamics, but top 
billing on the list may rightfully belong to the country’s costly policies 
and practices adopted to reduce the demand and eradicate the supply 
of illicit drugs.  Few would argue the merit of removing substances 
responsible for the degree of destruction attributable to many of the 
psychoactive drugs receiving attention, but the exorbitant costs of 
America’s punitive plan have failed to deliver results that justify the 
expense. 
An examination of the merits of the efforts expended fighting 
illicit drugs requires a better appreciation of the objectives and the 
allocation of resources to achieve those objectives.  Reaching a sound 
understanding requires realistic and rational analysis of the costs – 
fiscal costs, certainly, but also sacrifices exacted from the constitution, 
BEYOND THE MONEY: EXPECTED (AND UNEXPECTED)                             119  
 119 
demands placed on public and private institutions, and the prices 
associated with less quantifiable measures.  An accurate accounting of 
the costs of the “war on drugs” must then necessarily include all of the 
collateral damage, arguably as the most costly, the caustic erosion of 
the cornerstones of U.S. democracy.  The court cases resulting from this 
engagement have significantly diminished our civil liberties by 
shrinking the Bill of Rights, methodically abridging many freedoms we 
have previously fought so fervently to preserve – freedom of religion, 
freedom of speech, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
and property rights.  Perhaps, the only fact more staggering than the 
total overhead demanded by the fight against drugs is the balance 
sheet’s telling of our nation’s epic failure. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a high-level survey of 
our nation’s prohibition policies within the context of the costs of the 
law enforcement efforts upholding those policies.  The discussion will 
offer a cursory review of the economic expense of the war on drugs 
with tangential coverage of the constitutional, institutional and 
intangible expenses that are inseparable from an assessment of the 
costs of America’s drug control efforts.  Part I provides a historical 
review of illicit drug use in the United States, while Part II supplies the 
evolution of the country’s efforts to codify its drug control policies.  





Archaeological evidence collected all over the world chronicles 
human’s proclivities for the use of psychoactive substances known to 
engender altered states of consciousness. 1   It is believed that over 
12,000 years ago homo sapiens from the Stone Age ingested 
hallucinogenic mushrooms.2  Lake-dwellers in Switzerland more than 
4,500 years ago provide the first evidence of the domestication and 
                                                             
1 Daniel Kunitz, On Drugs: Gateways to Gnosis, or Bags of Glue? HARPER’S 
MAGAZINE, Oct. 2001, at 92.  “All the vegetables sedatives and narcotics, all 
the euphorics that grow on trees, the hallucinogens that ripen in berries or 
can be squeezed from roots – all, without exception, have been know and 
systematically used by human beings from time immemorial.”  Id. 
2 TERENCE MCKENNA, FOOD OF THE GODS: THE SEARCH FOR THE ORIGINAL TREE 
OF KNOWLEDGE 47 (1992). 
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consumption of poppy seeds.3  During this same time period in China 
and Neolithic Europe, there are indications of the cultivation of 
cannabis or hemp.4   
Before the lake-dwellers or the Chinese and the Neolithic 
Europeans, lore from India in the Brahmin tradition recognized the 
intoxicating properties of cannabis and heralded the plant for granting 
long life and sexual prowess. 5   Similarly, use of coca and other 
stimulants by the inhabitants on the continent of South America has 
been traced to primordial times. 6   The Bronze Age witnessed the 
expansive use of opium as a painkiller, particularly by women to ease 
the pains of childbirth and by others to relieve the discomforts of 
sickness and disease.7 In 300 B.C., Theophrastus, a Greek naturalist and 
philosopher who was also a student of Aristotle and a successor to 
Plato, authored the earliest undisputed reference to the use of poppy 
juice.8   
Our ancient predecessors partook of psychoactive plants and 
plant by-products to alter consciousness, certainly, but also for treating 
pain, for communing with the gods, and for survival.9  These plants, 
often rich in alkaloids, served additionally as a source of nutrition and 
                                                             
3 RICHARD RUDGLEY, ESSENTIAL SUBSTANCES: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
INTOXICANTS IN SOCIETY 24-26 (1993); Ashley Montagu, The Long Search for 
Euphoria, 1 REFLECTIONS 1, 62-69 (1966).  
4 Id. at 29. 
5 ANTONIO ESCOHOTADO, A BRIEF HISTORY OF DRUGS: FROM THE STONE AGE TO 
THE STONED AGE 9 (1996). 
6 RICHARD DAVENPORT-HINES, THE PURSUIT OF OBLIVION:  A GLOBAL HISTORY 
OF NARCOTICS 26 (2002). 
7 (2300 B.C. - 500 B.C.). See, e.g., R. GORDON WASSON, THE WONDROUS 
MUSHROOM:  MYCOLATRY IN MESOAMERICA (1980); R. GORDON WASSON, 
ALBERT HOFFMANN AND CARL A. P. RUCK, THE ROAD TO ELEUSIS (1978); PETER 
T. FURST, ED., FLESH OF THE GODS: THE RITUAL USE OF HALLUCINOGENS (1976). 
8 Svend Norn, Poul R. Kruse & Edith Kruse, History of Opium Poppy and 
Morphine, 33 DANSK MEDICINHISTORISK ARBOG 171, 174 (2004). In the 2nd 
Century, Theophrastus includes in his Historia Plantarum descriptions of 
different poppy varieties and methods for extracting “latex.”  F.J. Carod-
Artal, Psychoactive Plants in Ancient Greece, 1 NEUROSCIENCES AND HIST. 28, 31 
(2013). Theophrastus’s use of latex from the poppy refers to opium, using the 
term mekonio to specifically designate the juice.  Id.  His descriptions include 
opium’s medicinal uses. Id. See also, Halil Tekiner & Muberra Kosar, The 
Opum Poppy as a Symbol of Sleep in Bertel Thorvaldsen’s Relief of 1815, 19 SLEEP 
MEDICINE 123, 123-25 (2016), and John Scarborough, Theophrastus on Herbals 
and Herbal Remedies, 11 J. OF THE HIST. OF BIOLOGY 353, 353-385 (1978).  
9 Abbie Thomas, Survivial of the Druggies, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 30, 2002, at 11. 
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energy.10  It is, however, the ancient attraction to intoxicating fruits, 
berries, roots and other plants that is cited as support for the 
proposition that intoxication may be a universal human need, the 
“fourth drive.”11 
 Akin to the consumption of psychoactive substances across the 
globe, drugs have been part of America’s story even before it was a 
country.  Native Americans introduced early settlers to tobacco, a crop 
that eventually financed America’s development as a nation. 12  
European and Asian settlers brought other products—coffee, tea, 
alcohol, hemp and the opiates—to America. 13   Until the late 19th 
century, Americans were largely indifferent to the consumption of 
these drugs, which were then used legally and with very little 
government interference.14 
 The turn of the 20th century would witness growing concerns 
about drug use in America.  Interestingly, concerns were 
compartmentalized to some degree and divided by a drug’s specific 
association with a vulnerable subgroup of American society.  For 
instance, opium use was associated with the Chinese and a rising 
Chinese immigrant population on the West Coast.  Concerns about 
cocaine grew from the drug’s association with the “Negro” population, 
particularly in the South.  Alcohol use was associated with urban 
Catholic immigrants, while the abuses of heroin were attributed to the 
                                                             
10 Id. 
11 RONALD K. SEIGEL, INTOXICATION:  LIFE IN PURSUIT OF ARTIFICIAL PARADISE 
10 (1989); see generally, ANDREW WEIL, THE NATURAL MIND:  A NEW WAY OF 
LOOKING AT DRUGS AND THE HIGHER CONSCIOUSNESS (1972); and HELEN 
PHILLIPS & GRAHAM LAWTON, THE INTOXICATION INSTINCT (2004). 
12 See, e.g., IAIN GATELY, TOBACCO:  A CULTURAL HISTORY OF HOW AN EXOTIC 
PLANT SEDUCED CIVILIZATION (2001). 
13 KING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, DRUGS AND THE DRUG LAWS:  HISTORICAL 
AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS 6 (2005). 
14 The National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse reported to 
Congress in 1973, "[d]rug policy as we know it today is a creature of the 20th 
Century. Until the last third of the 19th Century, America's total legal policy 
regarding drugs was limited to regulation of alcohol distribution, localized 
restrictions on tobacco smoking, and the laws of the various states regulating 
pharmacies and restricting the distribution of ‘poisons.’” KING COUNTY BAR 
ASSOCIATION, DRUGS AND THE DRUG LAWS:  HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL 
CONTEXTS 6 (2005) (quoting DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE, 
SECOND REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG 
ABUSE 14 (1973)). 
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urban immigrants.  Concerns of marijuana use and the spread of its 




 CHINESE OPIUM AND THE “YELLOW PERIL” 
 
 The Civil War was a marker for great change in the United 
States, including what some consider the beginning of the march 
toward the country’s criminalization of drugs. 15   It was the use of 
morphine, an opium derivative, during the war that solidified the 
support of the medical community for the drug.16  American’s use of 
opiates expanded with the spread of patent medicines containing 
opium, the invention of the hypodermic syringe, and the broad 
acceptance of opium derivatives, such as morphine and heroin. 17  
Doctors frequently recommended opium, legal and widely available, 
as a treatment for any number of ailments, and in particular, physicians 
favored opium as a remedy for “female troubles” related to menstrual 
and menopausal conditions.18 
                                                             
15 By the Civil War, morphine had received broad acceptance in medical 
practice.  See, EDWARD M. BRECHER & THE EDITORS OF CONSUMER REPORTS 
MAGAZINE, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS. THE CONSUMERS UNION REPORT ON 
NARCOTICS, STIMULANTS, DEPRESSANTS, INHALANTS, HALLUCINOGENS, AND 
MARIJUANA – INCLUDING CAFFEINE, NICOTINE, AND ALCOHOL 3 (1972). 
Morphine derives from opium and was first discovered in 1804 by German 
chemist Friedrich Wilhelm Adam Serturner, responsible for isolating 
morphine.  THOMAS SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY 189 (1974). By 1826, the 
Merck Company was producing substantial quantities of the drug. Id.  
16 Id. 
17 Heroin is a byproduct of morphine after it is subjected to chemical 
processing, first discovered in 1874. David T. Courtwright, The Roads to H: 
The Emergence of the American Heroin Complex, 1889-1956, ONE HUNDRED 
YEARS OF HEROIN 3 (David F. Musto, ed., 2002).  Bayer Pharmaceuticals 
secured heroin’s popularity when it introduced it in 1898 as “The Sedative 
for Coughs.”  Id.  Heroin was also used as a cure for morphine dependency 
and to relieve symptoms of morphine withdrawal.  Id.  Its greatest medical 
demand, however, was in the treatment of patients suffering from 
tuberculosis, pneumonia and other common respiratory conditions and was 
widely prescribed by physicians into the 1920s.  Id. 
18 BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14, at 1. Many cure-alls and elixirs legally 
contained opium, frequently in the form of morphine, an opium derivative, 
though the pharmacological mixes were not required to disclose their 
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Large numbers of Chinese also began immigrating to America 
and accepting low paying jobs, primarily in mines and building 
railroads, in search of better lives not only for themselves but also for 
their families.  With large populations of Chinese settling on America’s 
west coast, businesses and the business class exploited the Chinese as 
a moral scapegoat to deflect attention away from the actual causes of 
California’s economic depression in the 1870s.19  The search for places 
to lay blame for the poor economic conditions found traction in the 
assessment of the “moral” aspects of the Chinese inhabitants, with 
special attention paid to the vices of the Asian communities, not the 
least of which was their proclivities for opium. 20   The result was 
duplicitous in that it was, in actuality, part of a thinly veiled 
discrimination program against Chinese.  Anti-Chinese sentiment 
intensified, Chinese exclusionary laws became commonplace and anti-
Chinese hostility toward Chinese workers escalated.21  By 1890, racism 
toward the Chinese was rampant, driving the proliferation of negative 
public sentiment concerning opium. 
The Chinese brought with them to America the practice of 
smoking opium.22 Although opium was commonly used in the United 
                                                             
ingredients. Id. The popular patent medicines rarely contained labels 
identifying their contents. Id. As a result, an unsuspecting population 
became accidental addicts, finding themselves addicted to the opium in the 
cure-alls and elixirs. Id. The addict population consisted largely of middle 
and upper class white middle-aged women. Id.  
19 Patricia A. Morgan, The Legislation of Drug Law:  Economic Crisis and Social 
Control, 8 J. OF DRUG ISSUES 56, n.1 (1978). President Rutherford B. Hayes 
signed the Chinese Exclusion Treaty in 1880, effectively reversing what had 
been an open-door policy set in 1868.  The new law placed strict limits on the 
number of Chinese immigrants allowed into the U.S. and the number of 
Chinese allowed to become naturalized citizens. Two years later, Congress 
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, barring immigration from China 
and prohibiting the naturalization of Chinese immigrants already in the 
United States for a period of 10 years. The exclusionary treaty and act 
represent the federal government’s reaction to the public’s belief that low-
paid Chinese workers were taking needed jobs away from whites, 
particularly during a period of economic downturn, to the public outrage of 
influence the Chinese smoking parlors had over the white population, and to 
an increase in anti-Chinese violence. Id. 56-58. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 The British actually introduced opium to the Chinese.  After the Chinese 
outlawed opium in the late 1700s, the British maintained their lucrative 
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States and was popular among all classes and races, ingestion of the 
drug by smoking was a distinctly Chinese practice.23  As long as the 
attraction was limited to adventurous young men, the American public 
voiced little objection, but when white women fell to the temptations 
of the Chinese opium smoking parlors, Chinese opium sparked public 
ire.  Thus, the smoking of opium quickly became one of the most 
identifiable Chinese vices and is the reported trigger for the rise of the 
“yellow menace.” 24   Opium and the Chinese smoking dens were 
synonymous with the corruption of American values and female 
chastity.25  They also provided a tantalizing explanation for the social 
problems of the day, emerging as a target for public antipathy and 
legislative attention.26  
 Early laws addressing opium addiction varied in their effects, 
but were consistent in their origins – products of local legislation – and 
                                                             
smuggling trade and began what became known as the Opium Wars. 
Eventually, China fell to the pressure to re-legalize the opium trade. 
23 See, RICHARD DAVENPORT-HINES, THE PURSUIT OF OBLIVION: A GLOBAL 
HISTORY OF NARCOTICS 46 (2002). The Chinese habit of smoking opium grew 
from the marketing efforts of British smugglers who maintained a lucrative 
trade bringing opium to China from England after China outlawed the 
substance in the late 1700’s. Id. The Chinese ban punished keepers of opium 
shops with strangulation but was designed to influence a great deal more. Id. 
China hoped to discourage its citizens from comingling with the “barbaric” 
Europeans, responsible for supplying the drug, and to protect the Chinese 
economy be curtailing the exporting of China’s silver, which was being 
traded for opium. Id.  
24 Patricia A. Morgan, The Legislation of Drug Law: Economic Crisis and Social 
Control, 8 J. OF DRUG ISSUES 58 (1978).  William Randolph Hearst, the 
infamous newspaper publisher, began publishing a series of articles detailing 
how Chinese men seduced white women with the drug opium, leading them 
“to ‘contaminate’ themselves by frequenting the dens in Chinatown.” Id.; see 
also, Stanford M. Lyman, The “Yellow Peril” Mystique:  Origins and Vicissitudes 
of a Racist Discourse, 13 INT’L J. OF POL., CULTURE AND SOC’Y 683 (2000). 
25 The San Francisco Police Department reported that while officers were 
visiting these opium dens they “found white women and Chinamen side by 
side under the effects of this drug – a humiliating site to anyone who has 
anything left of manhood.”  S. COMM., Chinese Immigration, It’s Social, Moral 
and Political Effects (testimony of the San Francisco Police Department) (Ca. 
1878). During the same period, the San Francisco Post published articles 
opposing the Chinese for having “impoverished our country, degraded our 
free labor and hoodlumized our children.  [The Chinaman] is now 
destroying our young men with opium.”  Id.  
26 Morgan, supra note 23, at 56.  
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in their purpose – eradication of the socializing of whites, specifically 
white women, with the Chinese.27  In some instances, city ordinances 
prohibited Chinese from using opium but permitted use by white 
people.28  In other instances, local legislation allowed the continued use 
of the drug by Chinese, but outlawed its use by whites.29 
 
 “NEGRO” COCAINE AND THE “SOUTHERN MENACE” 
 
As the opium epidemic engulfed America’s west, cocaine 
amassed its attack on the South.  Not unlike the Chinese immigrant 
laborers on the West Coast, in the late 1800’s, southern black laborers 
found cocaine to be of assistance for increasing endurance and 
withstanding strenuous working conditions.  By the turn of the 20th 
century, poor black laborers were developing habits for the drug and 
found sniffing or snorting cocaine to be the quickest and cheapest way 
to reap what was believed to be the drug’s benefits.30  Similar to the 
Chinese immigrants’ association to opium, the poor black laborers of 
the South became firmly linked to cocaine in the minds of the American 
public, but contrary to public perception, the predominant users of 
cocaine in the early 1900’s were not the black laborers in the South.31  
The drug was far more popular, in fact, with whites and especially with 
the white criminal element consisting of prostitutes, pimps, gamblers 
and other “urban hoodlums.”32 
Notwithstanding the drug’s popularity with the whites, the 
media provided significant aid in anchoring the public’s association of 
blacks and cocaine and in stoking the racial tensions that already 
existed between the blacks and the whites.  Another parallel between 
opium and cocaine at the turn of the last century was the media’s 
                                                             
27 Id. at 56-58; Joseph D. McNamara, The Hidden Costs of America’s War on 
Drugs, 26 J. OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 97, 98-99 (2011). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 CHARLES E. DE M. SAJOUS, ANALYTICAL CYCLOPAEDIA OF PRACTICAL 
MEDICINE, III 506 (1902). Cocaine’s popularity was certainly not limited to 
southern black laborers.  Id.  The act of snorting cocaine distinguished the 
use by common people from the use by the upper and professional class 
users who preferred injecting it with a syringe.  Id.  Cocaine’s “assistance” 
was so apparent that some employers, including plantation owners, 
provided the drug to their black workers to improve productivity and 
control the laborers.  DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 22, at 200.   
31 DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 22, at 200. 
32 Id. 
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sensationalizing the drug’s use and its abuses, which the newspapers 
promptly connected to a marginalized subset of American society.  The 
press fed the whites’ fears by publishing shocking fabrications of 
“cocaine crazed Negro[es]” leaving their farms and job sites on sexual 
rampages attacking and having their way with white women, 
reminiscent of the goings on in the Chinese smoking parlors.33  
 MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE MARIJUANA MENACE 
 
As the 20th century progressed, a new drug threatened the 
country.  Immigrants moving north from Mexico, in search of the 
American Dream, brought with them cannabis, which they called 
marijuana.34  Although hemp and cannabis were not new to the United 
States, it was the combined effect of prohibition and the expansive 
prevalence of the recreational use of marijuana by Mexican immigrants 
and Mexican-Americans that brought cannabis to the forefront in the 
1920s.35   
By the 1930s, marijuana’s popularity had spread throughout the 
country from schoolyards to neighborhood bridge parties.36  In fact, 
                                                             
33 “Most of the attacks upon white women of the South are the direct result 
of the cocaine crazed Negro brain . . . Negro cocaine fiends are now a known 
Southern menace.” Dr. Edward H. Williams, Negro Cocaine “Fiends” Are A 
New Southern Menace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1914, at IV-12.  Superhuman 
strength provided another legend attributable to the blacks’ use of cocaine 
and led southern law enforcement to transition from .32 to .38 caliber 
revolvers because cocaine-frenzied blacks were impervious to the smaller 
rounds.  See, MUSTO, supra note 16, at 7 (1999).  Harry Anslinger, the head of 
the predecessor to the Drug Enforcement Agency, advocated for harsher 
penalties related to cocaine use and possession by recounting stories of 
racially mixed groups dancing together at nightclubs while under the 
influence of cocaine.  See, HARRY SHAPIRO, WAITING FOR THE MAN:  THE STORY 
OF DRUGS AND POPULAR MUSIC (1999). 
34 RONALD K. SEIGEL, INTOXICATION:  LIFE IN PURSUIT OF ARTIFICIAL PARADISE 
273 (1989). America’s prohibition of alcohol in the 1920’s kindled an 
increased use of marijuana.  Id. 
35 BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14. 
36 WILLIAM O. WALKER, III, DRUG CONTROL IN THE AMERICAS 102 (1981).   
In New Orleans, the reporters in 1926 laid particular stress on 
the smoking of marijuana by children.  "It was definitely 
ascertained that school children of 44 schools (only a few of 
these were high schools) were smoking 'mootas.'  
Verifications came in by the hundreds from harassed parents, 
teachers, neighborhood pastors, priests, welfare workers and 
club women . . . The Waif's Home, at this time, was reputedly 
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marijuana “tea pads,” first surfacing in New Orleans and other 
southern port cities, had infiltrated most major cities in the United 
States by 1930. 37  The marijuana pads “resembled opium dens or 
speakeasies except that prices were very low; a man could get high for 
a quarter on marijuana smoked in the pad, or for even less if he bought 
the marijuana at the door and took it away to smoke.”38 
Not unlike the associations ascribed to opium and to cocaine 
before it, it was marijuana’s association with Hispanics that attracted 
negative public attention and opposition.39 The white majority’s bias 
against anyone not its own now also enveloped Mexicans.  The white’s 
intolerance intensified as competition for jobs grew fiercer while the 
“roaring twenties” fell to the Great Depression. Again, paralleling the 
Chinese earlier in the century, the Mexican immigrants became an 
intentional scapegoat for rising unemployment rates in the 1930s and 
for other social ailments as the country’s economic depression 
continued to bear down on its inhabitants.40 
The public’s indifference and the government’s abeyance 
concerning psychoactive drugs would not continue. Fear, economic 
pressures, sensational media reports and an epidemic of addiction 
joined to create a force demanding a response. 
 
                                                             
full of children, both white and colored, who had been 
brought in under the influence of the drug.  Marijuana 
cigarettes could be bought almost as readily as sandwiches. 
Their cost was two for a quarter.  The children solved the 
problem of cost by pooling pennies among the members of a 
group and then passing the cigarettes from one to another, all 
the puffs being carefully counted."   
BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14. 
37 SEIGEL, supra note 33, at 273. By 1930, New York City served as host to at 
least 500 marijuana tea pads.  See, Mayor's Committee on Marijuana, The 
Marijuana Problem in the City of New York, THE MARIJUANA PAPERS 246 (David 
Solomon, ed., 1944). 
38 BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14. 
39 MUSTO, supra note 16,  at 219-20.  The Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
furthered public fears of marijuana by publicizing official statements about 
police estimates that “fifty percent of the violent crimes committed in 
districts occupied by Mexicans, Spaniards, Latin Americans, Greeks or 
Negroes may be traced to this evil” of marijuana.  RICHARD J. BONNIE & 
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION 100 (1974). 
40 C.M. Goethe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1935, IV-9. “[M]arijuana, perhaps now 
the most insidious of our narcotics, is a direct by-product of unrestricted 
Mexican immigration . . . our nation has more than enough laborers.” Id. 
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III. AMERICA’S CRIMINALIZATION OF DRUGS 
 
 The “war on drugs,” at least as we know it, recently marked its 
forty-fifth anniversary, but America’s criminalization of drugs and the 
escalation of drug enforcement began just over a century ago. Until the 
turn of the last century, the federal government generally abstained 
from becoming involved in drug control efforts. Prior to that, the 19th 
century witnessed state and local governments promulgating the 
earliest laws addressing drugs; there were no national drug control 
policies.  The laws the states and local governments enacted were quite 
mild in their restrictions, and most placed the onus of policing drugs’ 
distribution on the health professions.41  Blanket prohibitions on any 
drug were rare. 
Early national legislative attention centered primarily on 
opium. Congress increased the import tariff on smoking opium in 1883, 
but left unaffected opium imported for other purposes. 42   In 1887, 
Congress barred the importation of opium by any subject of China, but 
it did not prohibit importing opium by non-Chinese concerns, nor did 
it restrict importation of opium from Canada. 43   Then, in 1890, 
Congress passed legislation that limited the manufacture of smoking 
opium to American citizens.44 
 
 THE PURE FOOD AND DRUG ACT 
 
In 1906, however, the federal government responded to the 
growing opium and cocaine epidemics with a new approach.  By 
enacting the Pure Food and Drugs Act,45 Congress stepped into the 
realm of public health and safety, an area formerly exclusively held by 
state governments.  The legislation did not prohibit the use of opium, 
cocaine or any other substance but rather, required all physicians to 
accurately label medicines to ensure the doctors disclosed the identities 
and quantities of the medicines’ contents and ingredients to all 
                                                             
41 Second Report of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, 
Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective 14 (1973). 
42 CHARLES E. TERRY & MILDRED PELLENS, THE OPIUM PROBLEM 747 (1928). 
43 ALEXANDER T. SHULGIN, CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES:  A CHEMICAL AND 
LEGAL GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL DRUG LAWS 244 (1988). 
44 BRECHER ET. AL, supra note 14, at 44. 
45 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768. It was also known as the 
Wiley Act. 
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potential users.46  Additionally, Congress required appropriate notices 
be included if the medicines contained any dangerous or habit-forming 
ingredients.47 
Despite the success of the Pure Food and Drug Act in reducing 
opiate addiction, Congress passed the Opium Exclusion Act48 in 1909, 
the nation’s first federal drug prohibition law.  The legislation affected 
a national ban on imported, non-medicinal smoking opium, and 
marked the success of the concerted efforts of the U.S. Secretary of State 
Elihu Root, Dr. Hamilton Wright and others to enact national opium 
prohibitions in advance of President Roosevelt’s Conference of the 
International Opium Commission in Shanghai in 1909.49   
Dr. Wright was intent, however, on even greater, more widely 
sweeping legislation.  Upon his return from the Shanghai conference, 
he drafted legislation entitled the Foster Antinarcotics Bill. 50   The 
legislation was founded on Congress’ constitutionally granted taxing 
power and provided for a federal tax on all drug transactions.51  It also 
required everyone who sold drugs to register with the government and 
record all drug sales.52  Unfortunately for Dr. Wright and others who 
backed the legislation, the popular support did not outweigh the 
nation’s drug manufacturers and retailers who opposed the bill, and 
the legislation failed, never coming to a vote.53 
                                                             
46 Id. It did not take long for the new act to debunk the belief that the vast 
majority of addicts consisted of accidental addicts.  It was soon discovered 
that many opium addicts genuinely sought out the drug solely for its 
psychoactive effects.   
47 Id. 
48 Smoking Opium Exclusion Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 614. 
49 Id.  It was a proposal drafted by Dr. Hamilton Wright, the U.S. State 
Department’s appointee to the American delegation to the Conference of the 
International Opium Commission. Dr. Wright advocated strongly that the 
U.S. serve as a model for other nations by enacting its own exemplary opium 
laws.  MUSTO, supra note 16, at 33. [1999] At the time, America had no legal 
ban limiting the use, sale, or manufacture of products containing opium or 
coca.  Id. 
50 H.R. 25241, 61st Cong. (1910); see also, Hamilton Wright, Report on the 
International Opium Commission and on the Opium Problem as Seen within the 
United States and Its Possessions, OPIUM PROBLEM: MESSAGE FROM THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 377 at 45 (1910). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 The Foster Antinarcotics Bill included cumbersome record-keeping and 
reporting requirements opposed by business and industry.  MUSTO, supra 
note 16, at 47-48. [1999] 
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THE HARRISON NARCOTICS TAX ACT:  “ . . . A ROUTINE SLAP AT 
MORAL EVIL”54 
 
 Dr. Wright was undaunted in his efforts to acquire 
prohibitionist legislation despite the earlier failure of the Foster 
Antinarcotics Bill.  During the next session of Congress, he, the other 
physicians who participated in the drafting of the legislation and other 
supporters succeeded in having the domestic drug prohibition 
legislation introduced into the House of Representatives.55  Opposition 
from business and industry, including the American Medical 
Association (AMA), remained ardent, but grudging compromises 
resulted in the Harrison Act being signed into law on December 17, 
1914.56   
  The new law required drug manufacturers and sellers to 
register their activity with the federal government, to keep records of 
their sales, and to pay taxes on each transaction.57  For the medical 
community, the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act provided a legal 
mechanism to ensure that those responsible for selling and dispensing 
addictive drugs, drugs such as opium and its derivatives – morphine 
and heroin, cocaine and others, did so in an orderly fashion, whether 
the amount distributed was smaller in quantities sold over the counter 
or was larger and required a physician’s prescription.58  Physicians and 
pharmacists had participated in drafting the statute, and they felt 
protected by its language, particularly the language shielding them 
from government interference in their practices.59   
                                                             
54 MUSTO, supra note 16, at 65. [1999] 
55 MUSTO, infra note 66. [1972] 
56 36 Stat. 785-90 (1914). The official title of the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act 
was the following:  “An Act to provide for the registration of, with collectors 
of internal revenue and to impose a special tax upon all persons who 
produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, 
or give away opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives or preparations, 
and for other purposes.” Id. 
57 Id.; see also, EVA BERTRAM, MORRIS BLACHMAN, KENNETH SHARPE, & PETER 
ANDREAS, DRUG WAR POLITICS:  THE PRICE OF DENIAL 68 (1996). 
58 BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14, at 48. 
59 The Harrison Act included, “Nothing contained in this section shall apply 
to the dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by 
a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this Act in the 
course of his professional practice only.”  Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914, Pub. 
L. No. 223, 36 Stat. 785, 789.  
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  Little did they know that in only a few short years, the Harrison 
Narcotic Act would transform from a relatively innocuous revenue 
measure into a powerful tool for federal authorities to regulate, and 
ultimately prohibit, a wide range of narcotics-related activities. 
Further, instead of enjoying protection of the language of the Harrison 
Act, physicians and pharmacists would soon learn that the language 
they believed provided them security would be language used against 
them.  Ultimately the language in question, the wording that shielded 
them from government interference “in their practices,” was deemed 
to be language subject to multiple interpretations.  Some 
interpretations supplied undercover Treasury agents the authority to 
arrest thousands of doctors and pharmacists for prescribing and 
administering drugs to narcotics addicts.60   In the 1920s, the Treasury 
Department charged and prosecuted more than 25,000 doctors for 
alleged Harrison Act violations, and over 3,000 of those charged served 
sentences in the penitentiary. 61   Although contentious legal issues 
arose, the Court rejected the Treasury Department’s attempts to use the 
Harrison Act as a prohibition against physicians and their patients.62  
                                                             
60 DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 22, at 230.  The U.S. Treasury Department 
took advantage of the ambiguous language “in pursuit of their professional 
practice” and instigated initiatives to adopt regulations forbidding 
physicians from providing drugs for addiction maintenance in cases where 
addiction was unrelated to medical issues.  “The manifest lack of federal 
power to regulate medical practice as well as the need to unify professional 
support of the Harrison Act may have required these vague phrases.”  
MUSTO, supra note 16, at 125 (1999). 
61 LAWRENCE KOLB, DRUG ADDITION:  A MEDICAL PROBLEM 145-46 (1962). 
62 United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916), provided the first major 
legal challenge to the constitutionality of the Harrison Narcotic Act.  Id.   In 
its decision the Supreme Court limited the scope of the statute denying the 
U.S. Treasury Department’s attempt to prosecute a doctor for prescribing 
drugs to an addict and the Treasury Department’s efforts to criminalize the 
addict’s possession of an illicit drug prescribed by his doctor.  Id. at 401.  The 
Court recognized that an act of Congress is only valid if carried out pursuant 
to an expressly granted constitutional power and, in so doing, held that the 
Harrison Act was not required under international treaty as had been 
promoted.  Id. at 401.  Therefore, where the Act was passed under Congress’ 
taxing power, it could only be valid for raising revenue.  Id.   The Court then 
found that both preventing a doctor from exercising professional judgment 
to prescribe drugs and prohibiting mere possession of drugs were actions 
unrelated to revenue collection, and the federal government could not use 
the Harrison Act to prosecute doctors who prescribed drugs or to prosecute 
the individuals who possess the drugs.  Id. 
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The victory enjoyed by doctors and pharmacists would prove to be 
short-lived.63 
                                                             
63 Notwithstanding the decision in Jin Fuey Moy, the Treasury Department 
refused to abandon its attempts to regulate the prescription practices of 
physicians and pharmacists.  Rather, it continued its efforts under the pretext 
of conducting “tax” law enforcement in a fashion it argued was consistent 
with the language of the Harrison Act and the Court’s interpretation in Jin 
Fuey Moy.  In United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919), and Webb v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919), two companion cases whose decisions the Supreme 
Court delivered on the same day, the Court explicitly upheld the statute as a 
legitimate revenue measure in Doremus, writing,  
[i]f the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the 
exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, 
if cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives 
which induced it....The act may not be declared 
unconstitutional because its effect may be to accomplish 
another purpose as well as the raising of revenue. 
 
249 U.S. at 93-94.  In the Webb decision, the Court went further 
holding that the legitimate practice of medicine could not include 
prescribing drugs to patients simply to maintain their addiction with 
no intent to cure them.  249 U.S. at 97-98.  The Treasury Department 
seized on this language to justify their continued pursuit of doctors 
and pharmacists.   
Three years later, the Treasury Department obtained an 
undeniable triumph that would consign significant and lasting 
effects on America’s drug enforcement policy.  In United States v. 
Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922), the Supreme Court upheld the Treasury 
Department’s criminalization of physicians’ prescribing drugs to 
narcotics addicts whose only medical ailment was the addiction, 
affirming the federal government’s position that providing a 
narcotics prescription to an addict was a de facto criminal act, 
regardless of the physician’s intent or “good faith.”  Id. at 289.  The 
effects of the Behrman decision would not be undone by the Court’s 
subsequent decision in Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925).  In 
Linder, the Court reversed course recognizing constitutional issues 
with the Harrison Act if in expanding the statute’s meaning beyond 
its taxing authority the Court’s interpretation was correct.  Id. at 21-
23.  The Court’s decision recognized that there could be medically 
appropriate justifications for prescribing narcotics to an addict “to 
relieve conditions incident to addition.”  Id. at 22.  By 1925, however, 
the government’s punitive enforcement practices were so firmly 
entrenched that “few were willing to challenge Treasury’s actions 
politically or in court, and the ruling had little real impact.”  
BERTRAM, ET. AL, supra note 56, at 75. 
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 THE MARIJUANA TAX ACT OF 1937 
 
 The next major piece of legislation in the criminalization of 
drugs in America was legislation proposed by Narcotics Commissioner 
Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.64  Proponents 
sought to bring marijuana under federal control, but they needed a way 
to do so without running afoul of the Constitution.  Relying, again, on 
Congress’ authority to tax presented the solution.   
To garner popular support, Anslinger looked to the power of 
the press.  Working through the media, Anslinger perpetuated the 
public’s fear of drugs by arguing that the use of marijuana caused 
insanity and led to violent crime.65  The Senate followed Anslinger’s 
lead and issued a report to accompany the bill, describing marijuana’s 
threats in the following way: 
[u]nder the influence of this drug marijuana the will is 
destroyed and all power of directing and controlling 
thought is lost.  Inhibitions are released.  As a result of 
these effects, many violent crimes have been committed 
under the influence of this drug…. [M]arijuana is being 
placed in the hands of high school children…. by 
unscrupulous peddlers. Its continued use results many 
times in impotency and insanity.66 
 Though there was opposition, particularly from the American 
Medical Association, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the 
                                                             
64 Congress established the Federal Bureau of Narcotics as a division of the 
U.S. Treasury Department in 1930, and Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon 
appointed his nephew-in-law Harry J. Anslinger as the bureau’s first 
commissioner.  SHULGIN, supra note 42, at 245.  Anslinger would become one 
of the most influential and prominent figures in the history of America’s 
criminalization of drugs.  Id.  He would become one of the most influential 
individuals in America’s criminalization of drugs and would later earn 
notoriety as the “father of the drug war.”  See, John C. McWilliams, Unsung 
Partner Against Crime: Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
1930-1962, 113 PENN. MAG. OF HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 207, 207-236 (1989). 
65 “How many murders, suicides, robberies, criminal assaults, hold-ups, 
burglaries, and deeds of maniacal insanity it [marijuana] causes each year, 
especially among the young, can only be conjectured.”  JOHN KAPLAN, 
MARIJUANA, THE NEW PROHIBITION 92 (1971) (quoting Commissioner Harry J. 
Anslinger); see also, NORMAN E. ZINBERG & JOHN A. ROBERTSON, DRUGS AND 
THE PUBLIC 178 (1969). 
66 Id. at 178-79 (quoting the U.S. Senate report accompanying the proposed 
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937). 
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Marijuana Tax Act into law on October 1, 1937.67   The statute imposed 
a tax on all marijuana imported, sold, or otherwise handled by placing 
a transfer tax on each transaction involving the substance. 68  
Additionally, though the new legislation did not actually prohibit the 
sale or possession of marijuana, it did require anyone handling 
cannabis to register with the federal government.69  If one failed to 
register, to pay the required taxes and to acquire the mandated transfer 
stamp, he was subject to fines commanding substantial payments and 





 THE BOGGS ACT OF 1951 
 
The Boggs Act of 1951 71  established the country’s first 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug-related offenses. 72   The 
legislation was in response to the concerns of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics over the rise in illicit drug use following World War II.73  
During wartime, the United States experienced a decline in drug use, a 
decline attributable to a variety of factors.74  One factor, a shortage of 
supply through medical channels, fostered the need for alternative 
sources for the drugs’ supply and unwittingly cultivated a black 
market demand.75  As the drug supply steadily diminished, the street 
price of the drugs continued to rise, attracting even greater numbers of 
criminal enterprises.76  In addition to creating mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug violations, and in part, to address the increased 
                                                             
67 Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 551; see also, David F. Musto, The 





71 Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 255, 65 Stat. 767. 
72 WALKER, supra note 35, at 170-71. 
73 Harry J. Anslinger, The Federal Narcotic Laws, 6 FOOD, DRUG, AND COSM. L. J. 
743, 743-48 (1951). 
74 WALKER, supra note 35, at 170-71. 
75 DANIEL GLASER, Interlocking Dualities in Drug Use, Drug Control and Crime, 
DRUGS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 46 (James A. Inciardi & Carl D. 
Chambers, eds. 1974). 
76 Id. 
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numbers of black market drug dealers, the Boggs Act modified the 
prior penalties associated with Harrison Act violations increasing them 
fourfold.77   
 
 THE NARCOTIC CONTROL ACT OF 1956 
 
The American Medical Association and the American Bar 
Association (ABA), troubled by the federal government’s punitive 
drug policies, joined forces to persuade a congressional subcommittee 
to reexamine the country’s drug dilemma, the degree to which narcotic 
drugs were an issue, and the efficacy of the drug laws in place.78  The 
double-team effort succeeded in persuading Senator Price Daniel of 
Texas to hold hearings across the country to study America’s approach 
to the drug problem.79 
  Daniel’s committee concluded in 1956 and reported finding a 
severe drug problem requiring drastic punitive measures. 80   The 
committee “accused the Supreme Court of permitting major dope 
traffickers to escape trial by its too-liberal interpretation of 
constitutional safeguards; it found the Narcotics Bureau could not fight 
the traffic effectively without being freed to tap telephones; the 
allowance of bail in narcotics cases was intensifying the flow of drugs 
into the country; and Bureau agents ought to have statutory authority 
to carry weapons.” 81   Further, Daniel’s committee condemned the 
concept of drug treatment clinics and demanded increased penalties 
for drug offenses, including the addition of the death penalty for 
smuggling and for heroin sales.82 
  Regrettably, it was not what the AMA and the ABA intended 
when they lobbied for reexamination of America’s drug policies, and 
Daniel’s study resulted in Congress’ passage of additional, even more 
repressive legislation – the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, known as the 
Daniel Act. 83   The newly enacted statute eliminated suspended 
sentences, probation, and parole for drug violations and, not 
                                                             
77 65 Stat. 767. 
78 RUFUS KING, THE DRUG HANG-UP, AMERICA’S FIFTY YEAR FOLLY 14 (1972). 
79 Id.; see also, WILLIAM O. WALKER III, DRUG CONTROL POLICY:  ESSAYS IN 
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 19-20 (2004). 
80 WALKER, supra note 78, at 19-20.  
81 Id. at 16. 
82 SHULGIN, supra note 42, at 246. 
83 Narcotic Control Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 567.  
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surprisingly, established new longer mandatory minimum sentences.84   
In addition to raising minimum sentences, the act increased both prison 
terms and fines for violations of the drug laws.85  Heeding Daniel’s 
request, Congress also included a provision for imposing the death 
penalty against anyone over the age of eighteen who provided heroin 
to anyone under the age of eighteen.86 
 
  THE DRUG ABUSE CONTROL ACT OF 1965 
 
The Drug Abuse Control Act created provisions that closely 
paralleled the Harrison Narcotics Act in their mandate requiring 
registration, inspection, and record-keeping by all persons concerned 
with any controlled substance covered under the Act and with the 
trafficking of those substances.87   Pursuant to the statute, the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) assumed responsibility for enforcement of 
the addition to America’s drug policies through its newly created 
Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, named for the legislation responsible 
for its creation.88 The FDA also promulgated new regulations under the 
Drug Abuse Control Act establishing quotas and limiting supplies of 
certain narcotics and placing severe restrictions on the manufacture a 
pharmaceutical amphetamines.89  The restrictions did little to forestall 
the proliferation of users of illicit psychoactive substances but did 
much to motivate the growth of a black market in "speed."90 
 
 THE MODERN ERA OF AMERICA’S DRUG POLICIES 
 
Until the late 1960s, the federal government’s role in drug 
enforcement would have been considered minimal, and the U.S. 
                                                             
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id.; see also, ALFRED R. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 26 (1965). 
87 KING, supra note 77, at 26. 
88 Drug Abuse Control Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 226. 
89 Id. 
90 The supply shortages created by the statute’s restrictions in turn sparked 
an escalation in pricing of the black market drugs sufficient enough to make 
the street’s profit potential attractive to new criminal organizations, a veteran 
business model first developed with alcohol in the 1920s, and later repeated 
with the opiates in the 1940s and 1950s.  DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 22, at 
312-13. 
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Department of Justice played no role at all. 91 Federal efforts consisted 
predominantly of customs officials seizing what they could at the 
nation’s borders, the Treasury Department's Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics investigating heroin rings, and the FDA regulating 
pharmaceuticals.92 A “war on drugs” did not exist.  
Richard Nixon, however, adopted controlling narcotics as a 
sizable plank in his campaign platform, and Nixon’s proclamation of a 
nation-wide necessity to restrict the availability, sale and use of illicit 
drugs gathered increasingly greater popular accord as his campaign 
progressed. 93  After his election, President Nixon unveiled a global 
campaign to eradicate drugs and drug traffickers.94 He established the 
National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse in 1970 and the 
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention.95 A year later, he 
declared drugs to be “public enemy number one,” becoming the first 
American president to officially declare a “war on drugs,” and setting 
the stage for each executive that followed.96  
 
THE COMPREHENSIVE DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL 
ACT OF 1970 
 
 A hallmark of Nixon’s crusade against drugs was the passage 
of the Controlled Substances Act as Title II of the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act.97  In addition to wholly replacing 
the Harrison Act as the nation’s chief legislative instrument of drug 
control, it positioned the manufacture, importation, distribution, and 
possession of certain psychoactive substances under federal authority 
and regulation.98  Congress relied on its authority to regulate interstate 
commerce as the basis to subordinate all previously existing drug laws 
under federal power, but an immediate effect of the legislation was to 
                                                             
91 DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF 
FAILURE 206-91 (1996). 
92 Id. 
93 MUSTO, supra note 16, at 253-57. [1988] 
94 DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 6, at 421-423. 
95 Id. 
96 In 1971, Nixon declared “total war  . . . on all fronts against an enemy with 
many faces.” See, SHULGIN, supra note 42, at 247. 
97 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). 
98 Id.  Three years later, Congress consolidated all anti-drug activities under a 
newly created Drug Enforcement Administration, further strengthening the 
federal bureaucratic mechanism for drug control nurtured by the Nixon 
administration.  See, Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, 87 Stat. 1091. 
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“effectively destroy the Federal-State relationship that existed between 
the Harrison Act and the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.”99   
In an effort to restore the balance between state and federal 
authorities that existed prior to the passage of the Controlled 
Substances Act, the Commissioner on Uniform State Laws drafted the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 100   It replaced the Uniform 
Narcotic Drug Act of 1932, and presented an arrangement of 
complementary federal and state drug control laws that soon became 
the national standard for the control and legislative enforcement of 
narcotic and dangerous drugs. 
Another feature of the Controlled Substances Act, it introduced 
five schedules or categories for drugs, arranged in descending order 
based on a substance’s potential for abuse and ascending order 
determined by a substance’s approved medicinal use. 101   As an 
example, neither of the illicit drugs heroin and Ecstasy have any 
accepted medical use, but their potential for abuse is quite high.  They 
both fall under Schedule I. 102   While substances that are widely 
accepted medicinal drugs, like medications that treat diarrhea, fall 
within Schedule V.103 
President Gerald Ford’s brief administration brought some 
amount of pragmatism to Nixon’s anti-drug measures.  Though 
President Ford maintained pressure for stronger controls, he 
acknowledged that eliminating drug abuse was an illusory exercise.104  
                                                             
99 Shulgin, supra note 42, at 247 
100  84 Stat. 1285 (1970); see also, Rufus King, The 1970 Act:  Don’t Sit There, 
Amend Something, 
http://www.druglibrary.ent/special/king/dhu/dhu23.htm. (last visited X) 
101 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). 
102 Arthur J. Lurigio, A Century of Losing Battles:  The Costly and Ill-Advised War 
on Drugs in the United States (Loyola Univ. Chicago Social Justice Centers, 






20losing%20battles%22. (last visited X) 
103 Id.  
104 Musto, supra note 16, at 257. [1999] The Domestic Council Drug Abuse 
Task Force released its White Paper on Drug Abuse during Ford’s 
administration.  See, Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force, White Paper, 
(1975), 
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/LIBRARY/document/0067/1562951.
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The more pragmatic tenor of Ford’s administration also found footing 
in the subsequent administration of President Jimmy Carter.  President 
Carter, addressing Congress, urged that “penalties against possession 
of a drug should not be more damaging to an individual than the use 
of the drug itself; and where they are, they should be changed.”105  
Federal law never reflected President Carter’s suggestions of 
decriminalizing marijuana nor his more realistic approaches to drug 
control, and any softening positions eventually dissolved.   
 When President Ronald Reagan took office, he brought with 
him an attitude toward drug control reminiscent of the Nixon 
administration.  America was emerging from the Vietnam War, and the 
reach of the Columbian drug cartels was international.  American’s fear 
of drugs experienced renewed momentum and found respite in 
President Reagan’s support of a strong law enforcement approach to 
drug control.106   From the White House Rose Garden in 1982, President 
Ronald Reagan declared, “[w]e can put drug abuse on the run through 
stronger law enforcement, through cooperation with other nations to 
stop the trafficking, and by calling on the tremendous volunteer 
resources of parents, teachers, civic in religious leaders, and state and 
local officials." 107   Congress’ additions to America’s drug policies 
reflected the prohibitionist stance of the Reagan administration. 
 
 THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984 
                                                             
pdf. (last visited X) The Council’s white paper indicated the problem of drug 
abuse was one that the government could only hope to contain, and it 
warned that the government’s ability to totally eliminate drug abuse was an 
unlikely prospect.  Id. at 97-98. 
105 Quoted in Musto, supra note 16, at 261. [1999] Carter campaigned on a 
platform that included decriminalizing marijuana and repealing federal laws 
that penalized people for less than one ounce of an illicit drug.  See, e.g., 
MICHAEL MASSING, THE FIX (1998). – need more detailed reference 
106 Id. at 266-67.   
107  President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing Executive Order 12368, 
Concerning Federal Drug Abuse Policy Functions (June 24, 1982) (in William 
Richard Files, White House Staff Files, Ronald Reagan Library), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42671. (last visited X) 
Nancy Reagan’s antidrug campaign “Just Say No” became a controversial 
component of the broad national approach to the elimination of drug abuse 
but was very popular with parents, schools and the media.  The 
administration’s fight focused on white middle-class youth and received 
funding from corporate and private donations.  Musto, supra note 16, at 266-
68.   [1999]   
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 In 1984, the Controlled Substances Act underwent change with 
a variety of additions known as the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984. 108   The new amendments included provisions for placing 
certain “designer drugs” into the scheduling formula and for seizing 
the profits derived from criminal acts.109 
 
 THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986 
 
 By signing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 110 , President 
Reagan significantly intensified the federal government’s fight for drug 
control and recognized the bipartisan support for tough new penalties 
for those who violated the nation’s drug laws.  The legislation 
established mandatory minimum sentences for violations of heroin and 
cocaine statues, and in so doing Congress created marked disparities 
in legal penalties for the possession and sales of powder cocaine and 
crack cocaine.111  Congress also established the possibility of a capital 
sentence for certain drug offenses.112 
 
 THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1988 
 
 President Reagan’s intensification of nationwide efforts to 
control illicit drugs continued with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988.113  With this legislation, the Reagan administration sought 
                                                             
108 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). 
109 Id.  
110 100 Stat. 3207.  The legislation received almost unanimous congressional 
support, partly in reaction to the overdose death of Len Bias.  Earlier that 
year, Bias, a promising collegiate basketball star, died suddenly from a 
suspected cocaine overdose.  His death and the prominence played by illicit 
drugs garnered front-page news nationwide.   
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 102 Stat. 4181.  President Reagan was adamant about getting “tough on 
drugs.”  RONALD REAGAN, RADIO ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND THE WAR ON DRUGS, The American Presidency Project (Oct. 8, 
1988), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=34997. (last visited X) 
Reagan announced that “we will no longer tolerate those who sell drugs and 
those who buy drugs . . .  they must pay.”  Id.  President Reagan’s declaration 
was an outward demonstration of his having harnessed the existing public 
momentum seeking a crackdown on drug use in America.  By 1982, over 
3,000 parents’ groups had assembled and organized under the National 
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to prevent the manufacture of scheduled drugs and to further 
discourage drug use by adopting even more stringent penalties. 114  
Congress opined "the legalization of illegal drugs, on the Federal or 
State level is unconscionable surrender in a war in which . . . there can 
be no substitute for total victory . . . it is the declared policy of the 
United States Government to create a drug-free America in 1995."115  
The United States would spend billions of dollars and convict 
thousands of drug offenders, but the notable goal was unattainable.
  
 THE 21ST CENTURY “WAR ON DRUGS”  
 
 Each decade of the last century witnessed ever increasing 
government effort to eradicate addiction, thwart drug trafficking, and 
prevent drug-related crime.  The 1990s and the move into the 21st 
century continued the pattern – new legislation continues, as does 
unprecedented spending, increased numbers of arrests and 
incarceration of drug offenders, and even longer prison sentences with 
little or no rehabilitative component.  The sad reality is that after 
billions of dollars, millions of man-hours, and untold numbers of lives, 
America’s punitive approach has wholly failed to eradicate drug 
addiction, failed to thwart trafficking and failed to prevent drug-
related crime.  In fact, the government’s expenditures and efforts have 
failed even to reduce these numbers for any sustained period.   
Success, however, has not been altogether elusive.  Our nation’s 
governing bodies, including the individual state governments, have 
realized unparalleled accomplishments regarding a variety of drug-
related matters, though these hallmarks cannot truly be counted as 
triumphs in the war on drugs.  Among those accomplishments, we 
have allocated and spent more money, enacted more drug-related 
legislation, created thousands of new drug-related crimes, and 
prosecuted and jailed more people, all with little in the way of 
corresponding victories to claim as a result.  The prevalence of drug 
use continues, epidemics of drug abuse are spreading, the rise of 
incidences of drug offenses and drug-related crimes abound, and the 
toll of the public costs escalates.  The hard truth is that the costs and 
consequences of America’s drug policy, with its increased 
                                                             
Federation of Parents for Drug Free Youth.  Gonzales, Laurence, The War on 
Drugs:  A Special Report, April PLAYBOY 134 (1982). 
114 Id. 
115 Shulgin, supra note 42, at 250. 
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criminalization of drugs and drug-related activities, its ever-exacting 
retributive sanctions and the intensified enforcement efforts have 
simply failed.   
 
IV. THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S WAR ON  
DRUGS 
 
 America’s national policy on drug control espouses a 
commitment to maintaining health, welfare and public safety, a 
commitment that arguably provides undergirding for all of the nation’s 
drug legislation, regulations, rules, and ordinances. 116   The 
implementation of our nation’s drug policy, however, is realized 
almost exclusively through prohibitive measures and the application 
of severe punishment touted as the best means of eliminating drug 
availability and deterring people from drug consumption through fear 
of punishment.  The upshot is that the entirety of our national drug 
policy, supposedly aimed at protecting both individuals and society at 
large from drugs and drug-related harm, is based on the myth that 
these aims can be achieved through police enforcement.  Almost fifty 
years of practice reveals a different story, but these lessons are not 
affecting a reduction in the allocation of resources—both capital and 
human—budgeted for drug control.  Below is an overview of some of 




The United States has the highest incarceration rate per capita 
of any country on the planet.117  Our numbers dwarf those of nearly 
every developed country, including those of highly repressive regimes, 
such as Russia, China, and Iran.118  America’s war on drugs is the 
driving force of these astounding numbers of mass incarcerations over 
the last four decades, the single largest contributor to new prison 
                                                             
116 The commitment of the United States is not unlike that adopted by the 
United Nations.  In the preamble of the 1961 United Nations Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, “the health and welfare of mankind” is the 
described impetus for the UN drug policies.  UNITED NATIONS, SINGLE 
CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961, 1 (1961), available at 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf. 
117 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6 (rev. ed. 2012). 
118 Id. 
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admissions being drug law violations. 119   The mechanics of these 
swelling incarceration rates consist of increased numbers of 
convictions in relation to arrests and increases in average sentence 
lengths, both influenced by the nation’s drug enforcement policies.120  
The Brookings Institution reported that in sixteen years, between 1993 
and 2009, thirty million people were arrested on drug charges.121  Of 
those arrested, more than three million received convictions with 
accompanying prison sentences resulting in prison admissions.122   In 
fact, each year during the sixteen-year study period, more people were 
admitted to prison for drug law violations than for violent crimes.123  
Considering the last 25 years, the number of federal prisoners 
serving time for drug-related offenses has risen by nearly 2,000%, from 
approximately 5,000 inmates in 1980 to over 95,000 in 2015.124  When 
state prisons and local jail populations are added to the federal 
numbers, our nation’s incarcerated swell from approximately 320,000 
                                                             




.pdf. (last visited X) 
120 There are a variety of contributing causes to the explosion in incarceration 
rates, but regardless of the dynamics that have led to the increase, growing 
numbers of non-drug related offenses are not part of the equation.  In fact, 
the number of non-drug related convictions has remained relatively 
constant, if not in a state of decline.  The multiplier is a rise in numbers of 
convicted drug offenders coupled with longer sentences.  Criminal justice 
policies, not changes in underlying crime, account for nearly all of the 
growth in our nation’s incarcerated population in recent decades.  Practices 
of law enforcement, prosecutors and the court systems are also contributors 
to the growth of America’s prisons.  See, e.g., STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. 
STOLL, WHY ARE SO MANY AMERICANS IN PRISON? (2013).  NOT CLEAR IF THIS 
LAST ONE IS A BOOK ETC. 
121 Jonathan Rothwell, Drug Offenders in American Prisons:  The Critical 
Distinction Between Stock and Flow, Brookings Institution (2015), 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-
memos/posts/2015/11/25-drug-offfenders-stock-flow-prisons-rothwell. 
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in 1980 to over 2.2 million today.125  Individuals incarcerated for drug 
offenses increased more than ten-fold during this same time period.126   
Related to these statistics is an even more dramatic growth in 
the numbers of inmates not convicted of a crime and being housed in 
local jails.  Increases in convictions and increases in bail amounts have 
contributed significantly to the rise in the number of individuals 
detained in local jails awaiting conviction.  Between 1983 and 2014, the 
proportion of convicted inmates at the local level grew by 90 percent, 
but the numbers of jail inmates not convicted of a crime escalated by 
more than 200 percent.127  Although data indicates that bail may be 
assigned more often than it was two decades ago, the bail amounts 
have increased pursuant to statutory amendments making it less 
financially feasible for defendants to secure bail.  For instance, in 1990, 
large U.S. counties assigned bail to 53 percent of their felony 
defendants, and in 2009, 72 percent of these defendants were assigned 
bail.128  Because of limited resources, a higher percentage of the accused 
have been unable to finance bail and must remain incarcerated in local 
jails while awaiting conviction. 
Additionally, between 1980 and 2011, the average length of 
prison sentences for federal drug offenses rose by 36 percent.129  This is 
an increase in prison time from approximately fifty-five months to 
seventy-four months.130  During the same period, the average prison 
sentence for all other federal offenders declined.131  Contributing to the 
higher numbers of incarcerated drug offenders is the disappearance of 
probation as a sanction for those convicted.  In 1980, 26 percent of those 
convicted of drug violations received probation.132  By 2014, judges 
                                                             
125 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET:  TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 
(2016), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-
in-US-Corrections.pdf. (last visited X) 
126 Id. 
127 Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1990-2009.  Felony Defendants in Large 
Counties, Department of Justice. – How can you find this?  Not clear from 
cite. 
128 Id. 
129 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCING LAWS BRING 
HIGH COST, LOW RETURN (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/08/federal-drug-sentencing-laws-bring-
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were sending nearly all those convicted of drug offenses to prison, 
reducing the numbers receiving probation to only 6 percent.133 
Vast numbers of drug convictions, longer sentences for those 
convicted, and greater numbers of accused being housed in local jails 
combine to effect ballooning incarceration costs.  In the federal system 
alone, one out of every four dollars spent by the U.S. Department of 
Justice, more than $6.7 billion per year, is expended on housing federal 
convicts.134  Maintaining state prisons and jails demands an additional 
$80 billion, an 89 percent increase since 1988.135  When considering the 
economic costs of America’s “war on drugs,” costs associated with 
incarcerating those convicted occupy a single line item among the legal 
institutional costs in the pursuit of a drug-free nation.   
 
 DRUG USE 
 
According to 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, an 
estimated 27 million Americans aged twelve or older were current 
illicit drug users, indicating that they had used an illegal drug during 
the month prior to the interview.136  This means that approximately one 
out of every ten Americans in 2014 was a current illegal drug user.  
These numbers are higher than those in every year since 2002.137  The 
National Institute on Drug Abuse reports that cocaine use among 
                                                             
133 Id. 
134 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM SHOWS DRAMATIC 
LONG-TERM GROWTH (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-
/media/Assets/2015/02/Pew_FederalPrison_Growth.pdf. (last visited X) 
135 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STATE AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES ON 
CORRECTIONS AND EDUCATION (2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/other/expenditures-corrections-
education/brief.pdf. (last visited X) 
136  SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2014 
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 4 (2015), 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FRR1-
2014/NSDUH-FRR1-2014.pdf. (last visited X) The National Survey on Drug 
Use and Health is in annual survey civilian, nine institutionalized population 
of the United States aged 12 years old or older. It includes residents of 
households and individuals in non-institutional groups, but excludes 
homeless, active military personnel, and residents of jails, prisons, nursing 
homes, mental institutions, and long-term hospitals. 
137 Id. at 5. 
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college-aged adults has risen sharply,138 and according to the World 
Drug Report, heroin use in the United States is up 145 percent. 139  
Trafficking numbers in the United Nations’ report are based in part on 
drug seizures.  The research reports that heroin and morphine seizures 
grew from an average of four tons per year from 1998 to 2008, to an 
average of seven tons per year between 2009 and 2014.140 
 
 OVERDOSE DEATHS 
 
For the last fifteen years, deaths related to drug overdose have 
been on a steep rise, 141 nearly tripling between 1999 and 2014.142  After 
recording alarming increases in drug overdoses, the Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) undertook an examination of overdose deaths 
in the United States occurring between 2010 and 2015.143  The drug 
overdose death rate in 2010 was 38,329, representing 12.3 deaths per 
100,000 people.144  Five years later, overdose death rates increased to 
52,404, or 16.3 deaths per 100,000 people, a 37 percent increase.145  From 
2014 to 2015, deaths resulting from drug overdose increased by 5,349 
                                                             
138 National Institute on Drug Abuse, Drug and Alcohol Use in College-Age 




139 UNITED NATIONS, WORLD DRUG REPORT 4 (2016), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_we
b.pdf. 
140 Id. at xiii. 
141 Press Release, Opioids Drive Continued Increase in Drug Overdose 
Deaths, Centers for Disease Control (February 20, 2013), 
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/p0220_drug_overdose_deaths.
html. (last visited X) 
142 Rose A. Rudd, Puja Seth, Felicita David, & Lawrence Scholl, Increases in 
Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths – United States, 2010-2015, Centers 
for Disease Control, 65 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1445, 
1446 (2016), available at 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/mm655051e1.htm. 
143 Id.  The CDC report includes drug overdose deaths recorded by the 
National Vital Statistics System multiple cause-of-death mortality files..; see 
also, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality_public_use_data.htm. (last 
visited X) 
144 CDC , supra note 140. 
145 Id. at 1446. 
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persons or 11.4 percent, continuing the rising trend that began in 
1999.146   
CDC researchers suggest that heroin and synthetic opioids 
(other than methadone) are responsible for the rapid increase in 
overdose deaths.147  They report a frightening increase from 2014 to 
2015 in the number of deaths caused from overdoses of synthetic 
opioids (including fentanyl), a staggering 72 percent surge in the death 
rate in a single year.148  Heroin overdoses leading to death increased by 
nearly 21 percent for the same time period.149  Combining the deaths as 
a result of overdoses of synthetic opioids and heroin, researchers found 
increases across all demographic groups, all regions and in twenty-
eight states.  At least one study reports that illicitly manufactured 
fentanyl is responsible for some portion of these increased deaths.150 
The increases are consequences, as unintended as they may be, 
of failing drug policies and enforcement approaches focused on 
punishing offenders.  The CDC warns of an  
urgent need for a multifaceted, collaborative public 
health and law enforcement approach to the opioid 
epidemic, including implementing the CDC Guideline 
for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain; improving 
access to and use of prescription drug monitoring 
programs; expanding naloxone distribution; enhancing 
opioid use disorder treatment capacity and linkage into 
treatment, including medication-assisted treatment; 
implement and harm reduction approaches, such as 
during services program; and supporting law 
enforcement strategies to reduce the illicit opioid 
supply.151 
                                                             
146 Rose A. Rudd, Noah Aleshire, Jon E. Zibbell, & R. Matthew Gladden, 
Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths – United States, 200-2014, Centers 
for Disease Control, 64 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1378 
(2016), available at   
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6450a3.htm. 
147 CDC, supra note 141. 
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150 R. Matthew Gladden, P Martinez, P Seth, Fentanyl Law Enforcement 
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COSTS 
 
The War on Drugs raises constitutional alarms dating back to 
the passage of the Harrison Act.  Since adoption of our nation’s drug 
control strategies, much of the enforcement of the drug policies and the 
effort to eradicate drug use have come with substantial costs extending 
far beyond monetary expenditures.  There are real questions 
concerning the constitutionality of many of the drug control efforts and 
the high cost exerted on the Bill of Rights.  Legal evolutions of 
mandatory minimum sentences, drug courts, drug testing in schools, 
and no-knock warrants arguably in violation of the eighth, sixth, fifth 
and fourth amendments, respectively, are taking their toll, shrinking 
civil rights and civil liberties, and threatening the freedoms associated 
with American democracy. 
Because the drug industry arises from the voluntary 
transactions of tens of millions of people—all of whom 
try to keep their actions secret—the aggressive law 
enforcement schemes that constitute the war must aim 
at penetrating the private lives of those millions.  And 
because nearly anyone may be a drug user or seller of 
drugs or an aider and abettor of the drug industry, 
virtually everyone has become a suspect.  All must be 
observed, checked screened, tested, and admonished – 
the guilty and innocent alike.152 
 
As Professor Wisotsky points out, there is tragic irony in the fact that 
“while the War on Drugs has failed completely to halt the influx of 
cocaine and heroin, both of which are cheaper, purer, and more 
abundant than ever,” 153  America’s drug strategy and crackdown 
efforts have systematically curtailed the liberty and privacy of 
Americans.  The law related to search and seizure provides just one 
example of how our civil rights and civil liberties have become yet 
another consequence of America’s war on drugs. 
                                                             
152 STEVEN WISOTSKY, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 180:  A SOCIETY OF 
SUSPECTS:  THE WAR ON DRUGS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1992), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/society-suspects-war-
drugs-civil-liberties. (last visited X) 
153 Id. 
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 SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
 
Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court eroded the exclusionary 
rule in historic proportions, all but erasing it, upholding the 
admissibility of evidence seized during an admittedly unlawful stop 
by police.154  The Court’s holding is simply the latest in a long list of 
decisions evidencing a slide toward the “anything-goes-in-the-War-on-
Drugs attitude.”155  During the Reagan years, the Court usually upheld 
the government’s exercise of power when the power was exercised in 
the fight against drugs, notwithstanding constitutional challenges, but 
the trend in judicial decisions was not limited to the Reagan 
administration and has continued long after President Reagan left 
office.  We see this trend as the Court failed to find objectionable drug 
agents’ use of a drug courier profile to stop, detain, and question 
people without a warrant and without probable cause;156 to subject a 
traveler’s luggage to a sniffing examination by a drug-detection canine 
without a warrant and without probable cause;157 to search a public 
school student’s purse without a warrant and without probable 
cause;158 and to search ships in inland waterways at will.159 
Homes, too, began to fall to the government’s power as the drug 
war escalated.  The right to privacy Americans enjoyed in their 
residences experienced serious restriction.  The Supreme Court 
approved the use of search warrants for residences obtained on the 
basis of an anonymous tip alone.160  It also upheld the use of illegally 
seized evidence under a “good faith exception” to the exclusionary 
                                                             
154 See, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).  In addition to protection from 
unlawful search and seizure, the exclusionary rule is also designed to 
provide a remedy, short of criminal prosecution, in response to prosecutors 
and police who illegally gather evidence in violation of the Bill of Rights. 
155 See, Wisotsky, supra note 151. 
156 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); see also, United States v. 
Montoya, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); and Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5 (1984). 
157 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 606, 706 (1983). 
158 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985). 
159 United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 US. 579, 593 (1983). 
160 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
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rule;161 the right of law enforcement to make a warrantless search while 
trespassing in “open fields” that were surrounded by fencing and 
posted with “No Trespassing” signs; 162  the right of the police to 
conduct a warrantless search of a barn adjacent to a residence;163 law 
enforcement’s ability to conduct a warrantless search of a motor home 
occupied as a residence;164 the power to conduct a warrantless search 
of a home on the consent of an occasional visitor lacking legal authority 
over the premises;165 and the ability of law enforcement to conduct a 
“knock-and-announce” procedure allowing less than five seconds 
before entry.166  Relatedly, the Court approved the warrantless aerial 
surveillance over private property.167 
The Court also significantly expanded the powers of police to 
stop, question, and detain drivers of vehicles on suspicion with less 
than probable cause,168 or with no suspicion at all at fixed checkpoints 
or roadblocks;169 to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles and 
closed containers situated within the vehicles; 170  and to conduct 
surveillance of suspects by placing transmitters or beepers on vehicles 
or in containers therein. 171   In another erosive decision, the Court 
reversed the Florida Supreme Court in upholding the constitutionality 
of the interrogation of a Greyhound bus passenger and the search of 




                                                             
161 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984).  The Court applied the rule 
to the search of a home made pursuant to a defective warrant issued without 
probable cause.  Id.  See also, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984). 
162 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
163 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
164 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). 
165 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
166 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
167 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); see also, Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 
445 (1989) (allowing aerial surveillance by fixed-wing aircraft at an altitude 
of 1,000 feet and by helicopter at 400 feet). 
168 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). 
169 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
170 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
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 UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
 
Mass incarceration and hyper-criminalization are a catalyst for 
poverty in America.  Convicted felons are substantially more likely to 
face challenging circumstances attempting to re-integrate into society 
following their release from incarceration.  The history of 
imprisonment and their accompanying criminal record impedes 
success in the labor market – employment limitations and depressed 
wages severely restrict a convicted individual’s abilities to attain self-
sufficiency.  A person’s criminal conviction negatively impacts him far 
beyond imprisonment and its associated loss of freedoms.  Criminal 
sanctions affect the felon’s health, debt situation, transportation 
options, housing opportunities, nutrition and security.173  They also 
produce adverse consequences for children and contribute to financial 
and emotional stresses that undermine marriages and familial 
relationships.174  At the community level, criminal sanctions promote 
inequality and often deteriorate citizens’ trust in the government. 
Convictions create criminal records that can present significant 
barriers to employment, housing, public assistance, education, family 
reunification, developing good credit and more. 175   Even a minor 
criminal record, such as a misdemeanor or arrest without conviction, 
constructs potential barriers that can prevent an individual’s successful 
acclamation in society.176 
                                                             
173 See, Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the Criminal Justice 
System 45 (2016). – How can you find this?  Seems to need a little more in the 
cite. 
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175 The Sentencing Project, Americans with Criminal Records, HALF IN TEN 1 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Americans-with-Criminal-Records-Poverty-and-
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 As of July 1, 2015, more than seventy million Americans, 
roughly a third of the nation’s adult population, possessed some type 
of criminal record.177  By way of comparison, this number is greater 
than the entire U.S. population in 1900; approximately equal to the 
number of Americans holding college diplomas; and if criminal record 
holders were a separate nation, they would comprise the eighteenth 
largest country on Earth (larger than France and Canada and three 
times larger than Australia).178 
 To further exacerbate the issues for criminal record holders, 
recent surveys indicate that more than 70 percent of American 
employers conduct criminal background checks as a prerequisite for 
employment. 179   The costs of possessing a criminal record include 
severely limited employment options.  Additionally, individuals with 
criminal records are often barred from obtaining occupational licenses 
that would assist them not only with employment opportunities, but 
also enhance their prospects for improving their socio-economic status.  
The American Bar Association estimates that there are over 1,000 
mandatory license exclusions for individuals with minor records, 
which may include misdemeanor convictions or arrests without 
conviction, and nearly 3,000 exclusions for those with felony records.180 
The incarcerated population is comprised largely of individuals 
who, even pre-conviction, are disproportionately poor and experience 
lower education levels.181  As few as 10 percent of these individuals 
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Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J. OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 451, 452 (2006). 
180 American Bar Association, National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/search/. (last visited 
X) 
181 See, Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings 494 
(Princeton Univ. – Industrial Relations Section, Working Paper, 2006) – How 
can we find this as a working paper?  Just checking the cite.; see also, Doris J. 
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market Conditions and Post-prison Employment: Evidence from Ohio (Bureau of 
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have positive pre-incarceration earnings. 182   The period of 
incarceration further reduces any earnings and places additional 
strains on families already experiencing a shortage of resources.  One 
study indicates the incarceration of a father increases by 38 percent the 
probability that a family’s economic status will decline to or remain at 
poverty level.183 
 Incarceration impacts health, posing health risks during 
imprisonment and increasing the likelihood of health risks post-
confinement.  Prisons at maximum capacity or, worse, at greater than 
maximum capacity, amplify the risks of the incarcerated magnifying 
the possibility of inmate injury, sexual victimization, disease 
transmission, and even death.  Overcrowded prisons forced to reduce 
their inmate population witnessed a reduction of six inmate deaths per 
year.184  Additionally, incidents of sexual assault are higher among the 
incarcerated than the general population.185 
 Criminal convictions also impact housing, not only for an 
individual, but potentially for his family as well.  The U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) does not unilaterally bar 
individuals with criminal records from residing in public housing, but 
it does allow each local Public Housing Authority (PHA) the latitude 
to establish its own practice concerning criminal record policies.  More 
often than not the restrictions of the PHAs are greater than the federal 
departmental guidelines, preventing individuals with a criminal 
history from qualifying for housing.  Even low-level, nonviolent 
offenders, like those convicted of alcohol and drug-related crimes, are 
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included in the PHAs prohibitions, making them ineligible for public 
housing assistance.186 
 There are other government assistance programs moved 
beyond the reach of individuals convicted of crimes.  Federal safety net 
programs, such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) have 
restricted access to those with criminal records.  Many states have 
overridden federal restrictions to provide access to convicted felons, 
unless an individual received a felony drug conviction.187  Thirty states 
deny SNAP benefits to convicted drug felons and thirty-six states deny 
them access to TANF.188  
 Beyond the ramifications related to housing and federal 
assistance programs, parental incarceration negatively impacts 
children.  More than five million children have at least one parent who 
is currently or has been imprisoned. 189   The demographics of 
incarcerated parents indicate that 1 percent of white children have an 
incarcerated parent, 7 to 9 percent of black children, and 2 percent of 
Hispanic children. 190   Further, individuals convicted of non-violent 
drug offenses are 20 percent more likely to be parents than those 
persons serving time for violent or property crimes.191 
 For the children, parental incarceration becomes a prominent 
risk factor for a number of adverse outcomes that include antisocial and 
violent behavior, mental health problems, school dropout, and 
unemployment.192  Boys as young as five years old who had one or 
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It is all but impossible to portray a true picture of the costs and 
consequences of America’s war on drugs without a complete 
assessment, and no complete study of the subject has yet to be 
undertaken.  Certainly, aspects of the costs have been covered over 
time, but a comprehensive undertaking of the easily quantifiable costs 
alongside the more subjective consequences warrants attention.  
Nevertheless, despite the lack of an accurate accounting of the full costs 
and consequences, there is little doubt that the government attention, 
human capital, fiscal outlay, constitutional erosions, and hosts of 
unintended consequences suffered by those convicted and their 
families present a bill too large for Americans to pay.  The 
unquestionable lack of any measurable success demands significant 
and expedient reform, and the longer reform is delayed, the greater the 
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